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TRADE-BASED MONEY LAUNDERING: 
RESPONDING TO AN EMERGING THREAT  
SAMUEL MCSKIMMING*
Concerted global effort has made the financial system an increasingly 
hostile and risky environment in which to launder illicit funds. As a result, 
offenders are increasingly turning to money laundering typologies that 
operate outside the financial system – primarily, trade-based money 
laundering. Despite this, enforcement agencies are ill-equipped to 
systematically detect and prevent trade-based financial crime. This paper 
makes several observations. The first is that, while little has been done to 
prevent trade-based financial crime, there is also little evidence of its ill 
effect. Further, there has been little consideration as to whether systematic 
monitoring of the trade system would be cost-effective, relative to the 
number of offenders detected and the harm prevented. Without such 
analysis, it is almost impossible to reach a measured and balanced view on 
appropriate policy settings. The second is that, even if monitoring were to 
be implemented, the analytical methodologies that are currently used have 
major flaws. They not only rely on data that is often of poor quality, but 
may also be worryingly easy to circumvent. This too raises serious 
questions about the effectiveness of the proposed policy responses to trade-
based money laundering. The difficulties associated with data monitoring 
also raise the spectre of a significant increase in the number of physical, 
and therefore costly, inspections of trade goods. 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
The front door of money laundering is the banking system … the 
government has done a pretty good job of closing the front door, but the 
back door – international trade – is wide open.  
 John Zdanowicz1
                                                 
* Researcher to the Hon JJ Spigelman AC, Chief Justice of New South Wales.  
 
The author acknowledges the helpful comments of Jim Joliffe, Deputy Director of Public 
Prosecutions (Cth), on an earlier version of this paper.  
1 Quoted in ‘Trade-based money laundering flourishing’, United Press International (online), 11 
May 2009 <http://www.upi.com/Top_News/2009/05/11/Trade-based-money laundering-
flourishing/UPI-17331242061466/>. 
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In 1995, a consignment of mink furs was shipped to the United States from 
Greece. At a mere US$12.31 each, the furs cost the importer about one per 
cent of what they were actually worth.2 That same year, a Greek importer 
purchased electrical capacitors from the US at US$1 560 each – a mark-up of 
30 316 times the normal price.3 Thousands upon thousands of commercially 
suspect international trade transactions like these occur every year.4 The 
literature is replete with examples:  an $82 set of golf clubs imported for 
$4 976, a $25 hairdryer imported for $3 800 and a $63 generator imported for 
a staggering $60 000.5 Suspicious transactions such as these might indicate 
the existence of any number of different financial crimes, including customs 
fraud, capital flight, quota avoidance, smuggling, or money laundering.6 
However, somewhat anomalously given the global importance attached to 
anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (‘AML/CTF’) efforts, 
systematic and comprehensive monitoring of trade transactions is almost non-
existent.7
Law enforcement is only now beginning to contemplate the challenge that 
trade-based money laundering and terrorist financing (‘TBML/TF’) presents.
 
8 
Comprehensive and expansive regulation of the financial system has made the 
banking system transparent and therefore increased the risk of detection for 
those seeking to launder illicit funds through it.9
                                                 
2 Simon J Pak, Stelios H Zanakis and John S Zdanowicz, ‘Detecting Abnormal Pricing in 
International Trade: The Greece-USA Case’ (2003) 33(2) Interfaces 54, 57. 
 As a result, offenders are 
reportedly turning to the comparatively unregulated global trade system as an 
3 Ibid.  
4 Maria E de Boyrie, Simon J Pak and John S Zdanowicz, ‘Money Laundering and Income Tax 
Evasion: The Determination of Optimal Audits and Inspections to Detect Abnormal Prices in 
International Trade’ (2004) 12(2) Journal of Financial Crime 123, 123 (‘Money Laundering 
and Income Tax Evasion’).  
5 Maria E de Boyrie, James A Nelson and Simon J Pak, ‘Capital Movement through Trade 
Misinvoicing: The Case of Africa’ (2007) 14(4) Journal of Financial Crime 474, 474 
(‘Capital Movement through Trade Misinvoicing’). 
6 Ibid 475. 
7 Ross S Delston and Stephen C Walls, ‘Reaching Beyond Banks: How to Target Trade-Based 
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing outside the Financial Sector’ (2009) 41(1) Case 
Western Reserve Journal of International Law 85, 99. 
8 Financial Action Task Force, Trade Based Money Laundering (Report, Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, 23 June 2006) 1 (‘Trade Based Money 
Laundering’). 
9 For example, Marie de Boyrie et al have found that the application of strict AML/CTF laws to 
the Swiss financial sector was positively correlated with an increase in abnormal trade 
pricing. See Marie E de Boyrie, Simon J Pak and John S Zdanowicz, ‘The Impact of 
Switzerland’s Money Laundering Law on Capital Flows Through Abnormal Pricing in 
International Trade’ (Working Paper, Center for International Business and Education 
Research, Florida International University, April, 2001), 16-17 (‘The Impact of Switzerland’s 
Money Laundering Law’). 
2010 TRADE-BASED MONEY LAUNDERING 39 
alternative mechanism for laundering funds internationally.10
Under this classification, used by the Financial Action Task Force (‘FATF’), 
amongst others, money laundering occurs either: (i) through the financial 
system; (ii) through the physical movement of currency; or (iii) through the 
movement of goods.
 From an 
enforcement perspective, the prospect of offenders switching from the 
financial sector to the trade sector implies a broad and complex substitution 
effect between the two. It does not, however, imply, for the reasons given 
below, that TBML/TF is ‘just another typology’.  Instead, TBML/TF is better 
conceptualised as one of three broad ‘classes’ of offences.  
11 While, of course, any single offence might use methods 
from more than one category, the taxonomy highlights three important points. 
First, mechanisms designed to detect and prevent one such class will not 
necessarily be effective against others.12 Secondly, increased detection in one 
class will encourage illicit activity to shift to another.13
As noted above, the classification highlights the fact that an increase in law 
enforcement resources dedicated to financial sector offences will not 
necessarily cause a concomitant decrease in trade-based crime. Tweaks to the 
existing regulatory apparatus – focused as it is on financial sector risk 
assessment, transactional observation and centralised reporting of 
homogeneous data points – will not detect offences occurring in the trade 
system. Financial transaction reporting – the ‘backbone of most countries’ 
AML/CTF regimes’
 With regard to the 
latter point, substitution between the three classes of offence implies that an 
aggressive response to the first two classes (for example the Anti-Money 
Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth)) may, 
ultimately, do little to reduce the overall volume of money laundering. Lastly, 
it serves to highlight the fact that, at least with respect to offenders switching 
to TBML/TF, moving between classes is not as simple as alternating between 
the various financial sector typologies.  
14 – is fundamentally incapable of detecting most trade-
based financial crime. Instead, there is a broad recognition amongst officials 
that new surveillance and investigative tools will be required to deal with a 
very different sector of the economy.15
                                                 
10 Ibid; Delston and Walls, above n 
 This implies further regulation and, 
7, 86–7. 
11 Trade Based Money Laundering, above n 8, 1. 
12 Delston and Walls, above n 7, 86–8. 
13 De Boyrie, Pak and Zdanowicz, The Impact of Switzerland’s Money Laundering Law, above 
n 9, 16-17; Trade Based Money Laundering, above n 8, 1. 
14 Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, United States Department 
of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Vol II - Money laundering and 
Financial Crimes (2009) 5 (‘International Narcotics Control’). 
15 Ibid. 
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therefore, further cost. Indeed, in this latter respect, it is evident that a 
monitoring regime for the trade system will not only have to supervise 
staggering trade volumes, but also a freight transport industry that is opaque 
in nearly every respect. The challenges are immense. 
First, the size of international trade, measured in both volume and value, is 
unfathomably large. In 2007, the value of international trade transactions was 
around US$25 trillion, up from around US$17 trillion in 2004.16 Of this, 
estimates of the amount laundered range into the ‘hundreds of billions’,17
In volume terms, in 2006, there were 440 million movements of twenty-foot 
container equivalents in and out of the world’s maritime ports.
 with 
the amount tainted by capital flight or tax minimisation likely to be many 
times higher still.  
18 This equates 
to billions of cubic feet of ‘shipping space’ that might require physical 
inspection. Indeed, around seven and a half billion tonnes of materials were 
shipped by maritime transport alone in 2006,19 a number that excludes land-
based trade and air-freight. Given that physical inspection is required to detect 
many TBML/TF typologies, the logistical challenge posed by such volumes is 
self-evident and overwhelming. Unsurprisingly, inspection rates are very low; 
most countries inspect less than five per cent of incoming trade.20 In 
Australia, for example, in 2006-7, around 140 000 TEUs21 were x-rayed and 
15 000 physically inspected22 – against a total TEU throughput of around 5.3 
million.23
                                                 
16 John W Miller, ‘Global Trade Talks Fail as New Giants Flex Muscle’ Wall Street Journal 
(online), 30 July 2008 <
 In this context, detecting and prosecuting TBML/TF is much like 
finding a needle in a pile of other needles.  
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121734618198593583.html? 
mod=hps_us_whats_news>.  
17 International Narcotics Control, above n 14, 5. 
18 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Review of Maritime Transport, UN 
Doc CTAD/RMT/2007 (7 December 2007) 87. 
19 Ibid 4. 
20 Delston and Wall, above n 7, 87; Trade Based Money Laundering, above n 8, 2. 
21 One TEU is generally defined as equivalent to a standard intermodal-shipping container. 
However, TEU height is not standardised – the most common height is 2.6 metres, which 
equates to a shipping volume of 1 360 cubic feet per container. 
22 Australian Customs Service, ‘Annual Report 2007-08’ (‘Annual Report, 2008’), 38. 
23 Australia has five container handling ports. The individual throughputs for 2006-7 are as 
follows: Adelaide (219 000 TEUs); Fremantle (506 000 TEUs); Brisbane (875 000 TEUs); 
Sydney Ports (1 620 000 TEUs); Melbourne Ports (2 093 000 TEUs). See Bureau of 
Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Economics, Australian Container Ports in an 
International Context (Information Paper No. 65, BITRE, September 2009) 21. 
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Second, the opaque nature of the international trade sector makes reliable and 
cost effective monitoring by law enforcement bodies extremely difficult. 
There are a number of reasons for this. Most fundamentally, because anything 
moveable is a potential store of value, monitoring capital movements in the 
trade system involves complex surveillance of an impossibly large number of 
different commodities. Secondly, every jurisdiction imposes its own 
regulatory requirements on the type and quantity of documentary evidence 
accompanying trade shipments. There is enormous variation in the substance 
of these requirements. Misleading, incomplete, inaccurate or even illegible 
records are routinely provided to government agencies.24 Many transactions 
are still conducted using paper records, often handwritten, in multiple 
languages, with even the simplest transaction often requiring more than 
twenty separate records.25
National and international businesses, traders and transport operators are 
faced with numerous documents and forms (up to 40 originals), often 
containing redundant and repetitive data and information (200 data elements 
on average). These documents, frequently not standardized, are complex 
and cumbersome for traders to complete and for authorities to verify. 
Moreover, if they exist only in one language, such documents and forms 
might be difficult to understand. Excessive paperwork takes more time for 
import/export and transit procedures and formalities and calls for the 
employment of more human resources in government and the private sector. 
This invites errors in submissions and malfeasance, raises trade transactions 
costs, and slows down trade flows.
 The United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (‘UNCTAD’) has described trade paperwork in the following 
terms:  
26
Finally, the various ‘layers’ involved in any one transaction do not aid 
transparency and can in fact work against it. Nominee shipping, in particular, 
is extremely common, as is the use of retail freight forwarders
  
27
                                                 
24 Nikos Passas, ‘Setting Global CFT Standards: A Critique and Suggestions’ (2006) 9(3) 
Journal of Money Laundering Control 281, 286; Nikos Passas and Kimberly Jones, ‘The 
Regulation of Non-Vessel-Operating Common Carriers (NVOCC) and Customs Brokers: 
Loopholes Big Enough to Fit Container Ships’ (2007) 14(1) Journal of Financial Crime 84, 
85. 
 that process 
and consolidate goods from hundreds of consignors. Illicit and legitimate 
funds might be commingled by these nominees or forwarders, as indeed might 
25 Åke Nilson, ‘Electronic Bills of Lading — Planning for Areas of Risk’ (1995) 2(4) Journal 
of Financial Crime 311, 311. 
26 UNCTAD Trust Fund for Trade Facilitation Negotiations, Simplification of Trade 
Documentation Using International Standards, UN Doc TN/TF/13 (26 March 2006) 1 
(‘Simplification of Trade Documentation’). 
27 A freight forwarder retails intermodal carrier services, as well as providing customs 
clearance, brokerage, insurance, documentation, export packing, etc.  
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be both illicit and legitimate goods over which they have a bailment. So-
called ‘groupage shipments’28 may contain thousands of distinct products, 
many of which are sparsely or inaccurately described by the consignor. Bills 
of lading and other tradeable instruments, such as documents of title,29
This paper is structured as follows. In Part II, it outlines the two major 
TBML/TF typologies: abnormal pricing and falsely described goods or 
services. In Part III, the paper highlights the challenges posed by TBML/TF 
for law enforcement and the inadequacy of the investigative tools so far 
conceived. Finally, in Part IV, this paper discusses the economic and social 
implications of TBML/TF. Part V concludes.  
 
disassociate ownership and possession, obscuring the shipping parties still 
further. Given this, a standardised approach to intelligence-gathering in the 
trade sector, especially in light of the data-quality and -consistency issues that 
have arisen over the last two decades in the much simpler financial sector, 
presents tremendous challenges. 
II THE MAJOR TBML/TF TYPOLOGIES 
At the broadest level of abstraction, the purpose of international trade fraud is 
to transfer value between jurisdictions and/or avoid tax obligations. In the 
case of money laundering, there is an additional motivation: to conceal the 
origin of illegally obtained capital by creating the impression that it was 
derived from an ostensibly legitimate transaction. Conversely, in the case of 
terrorist financing, the fraud is motivated by the need to conceal the 
destination of the capital by legitimising the beneficiary. In both cases, though 
TBML/TF has only recently come to the attention of law enforcement 
officials, the typologies used by offenders are often much older. In particular, 
capital movements in the trade system have long been associated with tax 
evasion and the avoidance of capital export rules.30
 
  
                                                 
28 Groupage shipments are those where shipments from multiple parties are consolidated into a 
single shipping crate. Often, groupage crates are shipped by companies who take goods on 
consignment from multiple freight forwarders, who themselves have accepted goods on 
consignment from the actual shipper. 
29 A bill of lading is a contract for carriage between the shipper and the carrier. However, it is 
also a document of title that can be endorsed in a similar way to a cheque. This allows a buyer 
of goods to enforce the conditions of carriage against the carrier, thereby circumventing 
privity of contract and allowing sale of goods in transit. 
30 Trade Based Money Laundering, above n 8, 2. 
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In this section of the paper, TBML/TF typologies are crudely divided in two – 
price and volume based methods, each considered below. While this 
taxonomy is convenient, actual offences are likely to use a mixture of each 
method, as well as using traditional financial system typologies.31 Further, in 
both cases, there are two preconditions for TBML/TF to be effective. The first 
precondition is that collusion between the parties is ordinarily required for 
TBML/TF typologies to have a capital transfer function.32
A Abnormal Pricing of Trade-Goods and Services 
 The second 
precondition is that the amount laundered has to exceed any trade transaction 
costs for which the syndicate is liable (for example, shipping costs, insurance, 
tax, transport risks and shipping time). These costs are non-trivial, which may 
mean that larger syndicates are the primary users of TBML/TF.  
Abnormal trade pricing occurs when the import or export price for a particular 
good is invoiced at a level that either exceeds the market price (over-
invoicing) or is below the market price (under-invoicing). Because of its 
obvious role in duties- and tariff-fraud, abnormal pricing is a primary focus of 
customs authorities. However, abnormal pricing is also one of the oldest and 
best known ways of transferring capital across borders.33 As discussed later in 
this paper, abnormal trade pricing is often observed in countries at risk of 
capital flight, for example those subject to political or economic turbulence, 
and/or those with tight foreign currency restrictions. More recently, attention 
has been devoted to the use of abnormal trade pricing for money laundering 
purposes.34
As noted above, the mispricing of trade goods has a central role in tax 
evasion. For example, Simon Pak and John Zdanowicz estimate that the US 
Treasury lost US$35.6 billion and US$46.2 billion in tax revenues in 1998 
and 1999 respectively, due to abnormal trade pricing.
 
35
                                                 
31 Ibid 7. 
 This tax fraud occurs 
in two primary ways. The first, simply, is the abnormal pricing of trade goods  
32 Ibid 5. 
33 De Boyrie, Pak and Zdanowicz, The Impact of Switzerland’s Money Laundering Law, above 
n 9, 5–7. 
34 Trade Based Money Laundering, above n 8, 2. 
35 Simon Pak and John Zdanowicz ‘Executive Summary: US Trade with the World – An 
Estimate of 1998 Lost U.S. Federal Income Tax Revenues Due to Over-Invoiced Imports and 
Under-Invoiced Exports’ (Trade Research Institute, Report 9904-01, 1999) cited in De 
Boyrie, Pak and Zdanowicz, The Impact of Switzerland’s Money Laundering Law, above n 9, 
4. 
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to reduce import duties (underpricing of invoices) or to inflate export 
subsidies (overpricing of invoices). The second, more recent, phenomenon is 
transfer pricing. This is where an entity conducting economic activity in two 
countries uses internal ‘transfer’ prices to shift taxable income from countries 
of high taxation to countries of low taxation. Because transfer pricing is 
conducted under the auspices of a single entity, central revenue authorities, 
rather than border authorities, normally address it. This paper does not 
consider transfer pricing. However, as both under-invoicing and over-
invoicing are also major TBML/TF typologies, there are good reasons to think 
that TBML/TF compliance will resemble trade tariff regulation. Indeed, given 
that TBML/TF typologies almost always amount to customs fraud, the 
potential synergies between border revenue authorities and organised crime 
law enforcement are highly relevant.  
In the TBML/TF context, under-invoicing transfers value from the exporter to 
the importer. The exporter sells goods to the importer for a below-market, 
discounted price. On receipt of the goods, the importer resells them and 
pockets the difference between the invoiced price and the sale price. The 
exporter has successfully transferred value overseas, with both parties being 
able to point to an ostensibly legitimate trade to justify the transaction. The 
importer, in particular, is able to explain the receipt of illicit funds by an 
actual market transaction with an unrelated third party. It must be noted that, 
as the exporter had to acquire the goods in the first place for a market price 
and as the second sale proceeds on a cost recovery basis, the syndicate does 
not make a ‘profit’. Conceivably, a small profit might result from price 
discrepancies between countries – but it seems more likely that a small loss 
would result because, in all probability, TBML/TF syndicates buy and sell 
trade goods indiscriminately and without commercial acumen. A particular 
advantage of under-invoicing is that each party benefits from reduced taxation 
and, therefore, lower transaction costs. Lower revenue for the exporter will 
minimise its taxable income (or even give it a tax loss) whereas the importer 
will reduce the import tariffs (if any) levied on the goods36
                                                 
36 Pak, Zanakis and Zdanowicz, above n 
 (although it may 
be liable for income tax on abnormal profits). This typology is illustrated 
diagrammatically in Figure 1 below. 
2, 54. 
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Figure 1: Under-invoicing of trade-goods 
 
 
Over-invoicing transfers value from the importer to the exporter. The 
exporter, by setting an abnormally high price, receives a better price for goods 
than it could achieve on the open market. The importer then resells the goods, 
recouping the cost of acquiring the goods in the first place for the syndicate. 
In circumstances where the over-invoicing is extreme, for example in the case 
of the $1500 capacitor mentioned earlier, this resale may not occur, as the cost 
to the syndicate of acquiring the goods is trivial.37 In an over-invoiced 
transaction, the amount transferred is the difference between the market price 
in the import country and the invoice price. The taxation implications of the 
transaction are generally undesirable as the importing firm will pay higher 
duties and the exporting firm will pay higher income taxes. One benefit, 
however, is that the importing firm will increase its cost base and pay lower 
income taxes as a result,38
                                                 
37 In such circumstances, as the goods are largely worthless, one might argue that this is, in 
effect, a phantom shipment (where no goods are transferred). 
 and the exporting firm may be able to fraudulently 
38 Pak, Zanakis and Zdanowicz above n 2, 54. 
Importer 
Exporter 
1. Sells 1000 widgets at 
$2 each 2. Remits $2000 
Market 
3. Sells 1000 widgets at 
$5 each  4. Remits $5000 
Pays income tax  
on $2000  
not $5000 
 
Pays import duties 
on $2000 only  
but does not have to 
pay income tax on  
abnormal profit of 
$3000 
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claim an export tax credit.39
Figure 2: Over-invoicing of trade-goods 
 This typology is illustrated diagrammatically in 
Figure 2 below. 
 
 
In either typology, there is arguably a preference amongst money launderers 
for: high-value but easily transportable items (for example jewellery);40 goods 
that do not attract import/export duties and hence generate little attention from 
customs;41 goods that are easily traded on secondary markets (for example 
commodities or precious minerals);42 non-perishable goods; or heterogeneous 
goods that are difficult for customs to value (for example art or antiques).43
It is important to note that while the terminology of over- and under-invoicing 
implies that the invoice itself is defective, the headline price on the actual 
commercial invoice need not be misrepresented for the transaction price itself 
  
                                                 
39 Trade Based Money Laundering, above n 8, 5; Konstantin V Pashev ‘Countering Cross-
Border VAT Fraud: The Bulgarian Experience’ (2007) 14(4) Journal of Financial Crime 490, 
491. 
40 Money Laundering Threat Assessment Working Group, U.S. Money Laundering Threat 
Assessment (Working Paper, United States Department of Treasury, December 2005) 44 
(‘U.S. Money Laundering Threat Assessment’). 
41 Trade Based Money Laundering, above n 8, 5. 
42 U.S. Money Laundering Threat Assessment, above n 40, 43. 
43 Trade Based Money Laundering, above n 8, 5. 
  
Importer 
Exporter 
1. Sells 
1000 widgets 
at $10 each   
2. Remits $10 000 
Market 
3. Sells 1000 widgets  
at $5 each  4. Remits $5000 
Pays income tax  
on $10 000,  
not $5000  
Can record an  
income loss  
of $5000 but 
does have to pay  
import duties on 
$10 000  
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to be abnormal. Common variations to the above typologies involve adjusting 
the transaction price (that is, the amount transferred between the parties) in 
plausible but indirect ways. These variations often involve an accurate 
valuation in the top line price for trade goods (thus minimising the chance of a 
customs inspection) supplemented by a convincing explanation for why the 
amount paid or received differs from the invoice. For example, this might 
involve issuing two invoices for a single shipment, issuing an amending 
invoice, charging late or administrative fees, or providing ‘credits’ for non-
existent refunds and returns.44
While the above discussion concerns trade in goods, it is possible that 
abnormal pricing could be used with respect to trade in services.
 Where these methods are used, detecting 
abnormal pricing can require an audit of the transaction in its entirety.  
45
Of the two typologies discussed above, under-invoicing is preferred by money 
launderers for two reasons. First, under-invoicing does not involve any 
contact with the financial system at the vulnerable placement stage.
  However, 
services, by their nature, are not usually transferable to third parties. This 
illiquidity makes trade in services unsuited to a typology that requires resale, 
such as under-invoicing. Services are more likely to be over-invoiced: the 
exporter will receive greater value than the service rendered without then 
having to complete a second transaction to make that value fungible. This 
would include circumstances where no services are provided at all. In fact, 
given the nature of the offence, it seems unlikely that actual, valuable and 
legitimate services would ever be rendered in a TBML/TF transaction. There 
is a question about whether the absence of transaction costs makes trade in 
services more likely (in that it is less costly) or less likely (in that less 
explanatory paperwork is generated, and thus, the deception is less 
comprehensive). 
46
                                                 
44 Ibid.  
 To 
under-invoice, an offender can purchase any tradeable good using cash or 
other unwashed monies – presumably from a vendor that has no obligation or 
reason to suspect the legitimacy of the transaction. By the time a reportable 
financial transaction occurs, that is, when the revenue is banked, the money is 
already cloaked by an ostensibly legitimate trade transaction. In contrast, to 
launder money through over-invoicing, criminal proceeds must first be placed 
with a financial institution to pay the inflated invoice, for example, because a 
foreign exchange is required and the counterparty is located abroad. This 
creates a reportable (and suspicious) transaction prior to the trade occurring.  
45 Ibid.  
46 De Boyrie, Pak and Zdanowicz, The Impact of Switzerland’s Money Laundering Law, above 
n 9, 8. 
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Second, in the case of over-invoicing, it is the importer that seeks to shift 
capital overseas, whereas in the case of under-invoicing it is the exporter. 
Importers are rigorously scrutinised by regulatory authorities as they are liable 
for import duties and have a general quarantine/security function. This 
scrutiny discourages money launderers.47 That said, because under-invoicing 
is simultaneously taxation fraud and money laundering, the goods must either 
be non-dutiable48 or the importing country must have a weak customs 
framework49
B Falsely or Inaccurately Described Goods or 
Services 
 in order for the transaction to go completely unscrutinised by 
authorities. This often means that under-invoicing is at its most effective when 
used to transfer capital from jurisdictions with strict border and custom 
controls to jurisdictions that lack them.  
Volume-based methods rely on misrepresenting the quality or quantity of the 
goods or services subject to the transaction. In such a transaction, while the 
price stated closely corresponds with the market price of the goods or services 
declared, the underlying shipment does not match the declaration. This 
misrepresentation means that the transaction is under- or over-priced relative 
to the value of the goods or services that are actually shipped. Thus, the effect 
is broadly equivalent to under-invoicing and over-invoicing respectively. 
For example, a party might falsify the quantity of goods shipped and thereby 
transfer more or less value than that stated on the commercial invoice. 
Similarly, no goods or services might be shipped (so-called ‘phantom 
shipments’50), with the parties simply creating fake invoices. Likewise, a 
party might misrepresent the type or quality of goods shipped or services 
provided in such a way as to misrepresent their value. While brazen cases of 
trading in falsely described goods involve making declarations that are 
patently false,51
In any case, to detect transactions where goods or services have been falsely 
described, a physical inspection is usually required. This means that such 
 more sophisticated launderers will provide general or 
imprecise declarations. If detected, such offenders can plausibly claim that the 
description, while careless, is not obviously criminal.  
                                                 
47 Trade Based Money Laundering, above n 8, 5. 
48 Ibid.  
49 Ibid.  
50 Ibid 6. 
51 The FATF reports a case where a TBML/TF syndicate falsely reported to Canadian customs 
that a shipment of scrap metal weighed several hundred tonnes. The syndicate was exposed 
when officials noticed that the hull of the ship was well above the water line. See ibid 10.  
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transactions are difficult for authorities to detect cost effectively. This is 
particularly so in the case of services or intangible property where the subject 
of the transaction may not be observable and/or assessable ex post without 
significant investigation.52
III THE RESPONSE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 
  
The use of the trade system to unlawfully transfer capital between 
jurisdictions was identified and documented in the literature decades ago.53 
Given this, it is somewhat surprising that TBML/FT ‘has received relatively 
little attention from policy makers to date’.54 A possible explanation for this, 
discussed later in this paper, is that little reliable data exists on the scale of the 
problem. With counter-TBML/TF efforts likely to be costly, the lack of data 
makes the case for increased law enforcement resources difficult to make. 
That said, TBML/TF is increasingly treated as the ‘next front’ in AML/CTF 
efforts by international compliance organisations.55
There have been a number of efforts in this regard in recent years. Most 
notably, the Financial Action Task Force released a typologies report on 
TBML/TF in 2006,
  
56 which was followed up in June 2008 with a best 
practices paper.57 As yet there is, however, no specific FATF 
Recommendation on TBML/TF. Indeed, there are legitimate questions about 
whether the FATF’s mandate extends to the trade system and whether it is the 
best forum to propagate reform, given the existence of international 
organisations devoted specifically to trade security and border control. It may 
be, for instance, that the FATF’s financial sector expertise is of little practical 
benefit in the trade sector. In the Asia-Pacific, the Asia/Pacific Group on 
Money Laundering described TBML/TF in the 2004-05 typologies report58
                                                 
52 Ibid 6.  
 
53 Jagdish Bhagwati, ‘On the Underinvoicing of Imports’ (1964) 26(4) Bulletin of the Oxford 
University Institute of Economics and Statistics 389 (‘On the Underinvoicing of Imports’); 
Jagdish Bhagwati, ‘Fiscal Policy: The Faking of Foreign Trade Declarations and the Balance 
of Payments’ (1967) 29(1) Bulletin of the Oxford University Institute of Economics and 
Statistics 61. 
54 Financial Action Task Force, Best Practices Paper on Trade Based Money Laundering 
(Report, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 20 June 2008) 5 (‘Best 
Practices Paper on Trade Based Money Laundering’). 
55 Delston and Walls, above n 7, 117. 
56 Trade Based Money Laundering, above n 8. 
57 Best Practices Paper on Trade Based Money Laundering, above n 54.   
58 APG Typologies Working Group, APG Yearly Typologies Report 2004-05 (‘Typologies 
Report, Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, June 2005’) 8.  
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and has continued to expend significant time on the issue in workshops.59 
Both the Egmont Group60 and the Wolfsberg Group61
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the pedigree of the AML/CTF regulators, much 
of the aforementioned policymaking seems to be preoccupied with adapting 
AML/CTF regulation from the financial sector and applying it to the trade 
sector.
 have acknowledged the 
TBML/TF problem. Again, however, given their preponderant focus on the 
financial sector, it is questionable whether these organisations are well placed 
to pursue a TBML/TF agenda. There is also, conceivably, a question about 
whether the expertise of these organisations extends to perennially delicate 
trade negotiations.  
62 The FATF, for example, advocates imposing reporting requirements, 
much like those that apply to the financial sector, on the trade sector and on 
traders in particular. Similarly, many, including the FATF, advocate 
AML/CTF auditing for traders. There are, of course, very real reasons to 
apply AML/CTF regulation to traders themselves rather than to financial 
intermediaries.63 Financial institutions are not well positioned to detect and 
report TBML/TF, given that, for 80 per cent of trade transactions, they 
provide no direct finance and are only able to see ‘clean payments’.64
Without detailed analysis of the sector, there is a clear and present risk that 
any TBML/TF regulation could prove costly and/or ineffective. For example, 
common proposals for reform include the expansion of customer 
identification requirements to traders
 There 
are equally good reasons to learn from decades of AML/CTF experience in 
the financial sector. That said, there has been little attention given to the ways 
in which a regulatory regime might be tailored to the specific requirements of 
the freight sector.  
65 and the improvement of trade 
documentation.66
                                                 
59 Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, Annual Report 1 July 2005 – 30 June 2006 
(‘Annual Report, Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, March 2008’) 12; Asia/Pacific 
Group on Money Laundering, The Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering Information 
Quarterly (‘Quarterly Newsletter, Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, November 
2005’) 1-2. 
 However, because agency shipping is ubiquitous, 
60 The Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, Annual Report July 2008 – June 2009 
(‘Report, The Egmont Group, July 2008 – June 2009’) 6.  
61 The Wolfsberg Group, The Wolfsberg Trade Finance Principles (2009) 
<http://www.wolfsberg-principles.com/pdf/WG_Trade_Finance_Principles_Final_(Jan_09). 
pdf>.  
62 Best Practices Paper on Trade Based Money Laundering, above n 54, 2-4. 
63 Delston and Walls, above n 7, 117. 
64 The Wolfsberg Group, above n 61, 1. 
65 Delston and Walls, above n 7, 117. 
66 Passas, above n 24, 85; Nilson, above n 25, 311–12. 
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identification requirements will need to be onerous indeed to discover 
beneficial ownership. Likewise, while the idea of improving documentation is 
laudable, trade documentation covers trillions of dollars worth of multifarious 
and heterogeneous trade transactions. Exactly how it might be improved and 
at what cost, is yet to be specified. Indeed, simplification of trade 
documentation has been a goal of trade reformers for at least four decades.67 It 
is improbable that the TBML/TF threat will motivate jurisdictions to resolve 
the intractable problems encountered thus far in long-running negotiations 
over trade documentation. Other regulations of questionable cost effectiveness 
include the designation of an AML/CTF compliance officer within traders; 
ongoing training of personnel; AML/CTF auditing and other remedies 
imported from the financial sector.68
Most controversially, given the potential cost, is the imposition of suspicious 
transaction reporting obligations on traders.
 This is because many traders lack the 
pre-existing compliance culture and expertise that exists within financial 
institutions and will have to develop such systems from scratch. 
69 This obligation, whilst unlikely 
to impose actual investigative responsibility on traders, would be guided by 
red-flag indicators, much as it is in the financial sector. Delston has listed 
many of these indicators, including shipments to or from high-risk countries; 
apparently uncommercial transactions; the transport of items unrelated to a 
trader’s business; frequent amendments to trade documentation; the 
involvement of third parties and/or shell companies; and carousel transactions 
(the importing and exporting of the same commodity).70
While there is little in-principle objection to such an arrangement (though 
privacy concerns are likely to be acute), there is significant doubt about the 
effectiveness of a reporting framework in the trade sector. Given the current 
industry structure, any given consignment is likely to pass through ‘many 
hands’. Few of these companies – given a lack of direct contact with either the 
goods or the customer or both – will be in a position to detect suspicious 
transactions on the information available to them. Indeed, it is unlikely that 
any firm would be in a position to observe a transaction in its entirety, and 
thus be in a position to meaningfully comply with a reporting obligation. 
 
Consider, for example, that a groupage shipment might originate at a UK 
business, be consolidated by a groupage company, be bailed to a consolidator, 
be shipped by a shipping agent, transit through Singapore and so on. Given 
this complexity, it is currently unclear upon whom a reporting obligation 
                                                 
67 Simplification of Trade Documentation, UN Doc TN/TF/13, 1.  
68 Delston and Walls, above n 7, 117. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Trade Based Money Laundering, above n 8, 24; Delston and Walls, above n 7, 104–6.  
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would fall and what level of customer and documentary diligence would be 
expected of them. Given the limited ability of trading companies to monitor 
shipments in their entirety, even an oppressive obligation could prove 
ineffective. Indeed, perhaps in recognition of this latter fact, advocates for 
suspicious trade transaction reporting often also advocate increased public 
resources for physical inspection and intelligence-based operations.71
A The US Government’s Response to TBML/TF 
 Whether 
or not such increases eventuate, and what the division of responsibility 
between private and public enforcement would ideally be, is unknown.  
Despite an increased level of awareness of TBML/TF and trade security 
generally, actual institutional or regulatory change at the national level is 
something of a rarity.72 The United States is the notable exception. In 2003, 
the US Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs first 
described TBML/TF as a distinct typology.73 By 2007, TBML/TF had been 
identified as a ‘priority threat’74 and the government was acknowledging that 
trade-based remittance systems were ‘entrenched’.75
The most notable policy response was the formation of Trade Transparency 
Units (‘TTUs’) within Immigration and Customs Enforcement (‘ICE’). The 
first TTU was created in 2004 to ‘collect and analyze suspect trade data and 
then disseminate findings for appropriate enforcement action’.
 Considerable resources 
are now devoted to the TBML/TF threat by US authorities. 
76 The 
collection of such data was not, in itself, a new development. However, while 
ICE had always been able to monitor trade prices, it did not have a TBML/TF 
focus or appropriate enforcement tools.77
                                                 
71 Best Practices Paper on Trade Based Money Laundering, above n 
 Moreover, its systems only recorded 
data submitted to US authorities. By contrast, the TTUs are designed as 
specialist TBML/TF investigators. Moreover, they are able to detect 
discrepancies between the documentation lodged with foreign authorities and 
54, [11]–[13], [20], 
[33](e). 
72 Delston and Walls, above n 7, 87-9, 99. 
73 International Narcotics Control, above n 14, 5. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, US Department of State, 
Trade Transparency Units: International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Volume II - 
Money laundering and Financial Crimes (March 2005), <http://www.state.gov/p/ 
inl/rls/nrcrpt/2005/vol2/html/42381.htm> (‘Trade Transparency Units’). 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid. 
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the documentation lodged locally.78
At the core of the TTU concept is the Data Analysis & Research for Trade 
Transparency System (DARTTS), an ICE computer system designed to 
analyze import/export and financial data of the United States and its foreign 
partners for the purpose of identifying trade anomalies and financial 
irregularities. These anomalies and irregularities often serve as indicators of 
money laundering, customs fraud, contraband smuggling, and even tax 
evasion (e.g. value added tax, income tax, duty, tariff).
 This is described publicly in the 
following terms: 
79
To obtain such data, the US government has begun sponsoring a ‘worldwide 
TTU network somewhat analogous to the Egmont Group of Financial 
Intelligence Units (‘FIUs’).
 
80 Foreign TTUs have now been established in 
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Mexico and Columbia.81 In 2010, Panama will 
become the sixth country to host a US-sponsored TTU.82 The focus on Latin 
America reflects longstanding intelligence that drug producers are using 
TBML/TF to transfer revenue out of the United States. The US government 
has also approached Eastern and Central European countries about 
establishing local TTUs,83 but this is yet to produce results.84
B Current Analytical Techniques for TBML/TF 
Detection 
 While the 
aspiration of the US government is for a global network of TTUs, the current 
network is limited. 
As far as can be ascertained from public information, the US government’s 
TTUs are utilising two different TBML/TF detection techniques. These can be 
roughly described as unit price analysis and bilateral trade price analysis. Both 
                                                 
78 Ibid.  
79 Office of Investigations, Topics of Interest: Trade-Based Money Laundering (26 March 
2009), US Immigration and Customs Enforcement <http://www.ice.gov/partners/financial/ 
topics.htm>.  
80 Trade Transparency Unit, above n 75.  A financial intelligence unit is a specialist 
investigative body that systematically monitors the financial and banking system for law 
enforcement (including, usually, tax compliance) purposes. The Australian FIU is the 
Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (‘AUSTRAC’). 
81 US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ‘ICE launches Trade Transparency Unit in 
Mexico City as Part of Bi-Lateral Cooperation with Mexico Customs’ (Media Release, 12 
June 2008) <http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/newsreleases/articles/080612mexicocity.htm>. 
82 Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, United States Department 
of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Vol II - Money laundering and 
Financial Crimes (2010) 11. 
83 Trade Transparency Units, above n 75.   
84 International Narcotics Control, above n 14, 18. 
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techniques use existing customs data and do not require radical changes to 
trade regulation.85 Both are endorsed by the FATF.86 However, neither 
technique is generally effective at detecting volume-based typologies; these 
require physical inspection and/or intelligence-based investigation to detect.87
Pak et al are often credited with giving the first exposition of unit price 
analysis.
 
That said, to the extent that the data mining techniques reveal suspicious 
transactions and/or traders, this can inform the investigation of volume-based 
typologies. 
88 Requiring highly disaggregated trade data, unit price analysis 
classifies individual transactions into a harmonised system of goods 
classification, for example textiles, resources, foodstuffs. As the name 
suggests, the methodology calculates a ‘per unit’ price (usually an average, or 
weighted average, price) to detect abnormal trade pricing. By averaging prices 
across highly specific product categories, unit price analysis identifies as 
suspicious those transactions that deviate from a mean and/or median. Clearly, 
for this to be effective, heterogeneity within each product category must be 
minimised in order to cluster the prices closely.89
The second technique – bilateral trade price analysis – is much older. It was 
developed prior to the widespread use of harmonised trade codes, when only 
highly aggregated trade data was available. The existence of harmonised trade 
codes has made the technique more effective, but the methodology is still the 
same. The basic reference remains Bhagwati.
 While this is unlikely to be 
problematic in exchange-traded homogeneous commodities, it is likely to be 
enormously difficult in most other product categories. 
90 The simple premise of the 
analysis is that imports in any one country must originate as exports in 
another. Hence, the ratio of imports from one country to exports from another 
ought to equal one.91
                                                 
85 Trade Transparency Units, above n 
 Once legitimate explanations for a discrepancy are 
excluded, a ratio that does not equal one indicates valuation discrepancies and 
abnormal trade prices.  
75; K Kibble, ‘Countering Trans-border Threats’, 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Conference Presentation, (Seattle, 15 April 2008). 
86 Best Practices Paper on Trade Based Money Laundering, above n 54, 2–4. 
87 Trade Based Money Laundering, above n 8, 5. 
88 S Pak and J Zdanowicz, ‘The statistical analysis of the U.S. merchandise trade database and 
its uses in transfer pricing compliance and enforcement’ (1994) 3(1) Tax Management 50; 
Pak, Zanakis and Zdanowicz, above n 2; John Zdanowicz, Simon Pak and Michael Sullivan 
‘Brazil-United States Trade: Capital Flight Through Abnormal Pricing’ (1999) 13(4) The 
International Trade Journal 423. 
89 Zdanowicz, Pak and Sullivan, above n 88, 432. 
90 Bhagwati, ‘On the Underinvoicing of Imports’, above n 53.  
91 Luc de Wulf, ‘Statistical Analysis of Under- and OverInvoicing of Imports’ (1981) 8 Journal 
of Development Economics 303, 304. 
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Both techniques are limited by poor data quality. In international trade, 
erroneous assignments of origin or destination are extremely common.92 This 
is particularly true when the shipment passes through global transit ports, for 
example Singapore,93 or the exporter/importer is not actually located in the 
origin/destination country.94 Classification errors occur either accidentally 
(because there are a very large number of classifications many shippers use 
the wrong code or use the general codes) or for illicit purposes (for example, 
evading quotas, avoiding tax).95 Further, it is difficult to exclude the 
possibility that a shipment has changed en-route; for example, the value or 
exchange rate might change.96 Lastly, a customs valuation/declaration does 
not always mimic the invoice,97 often for legitimate commercial reasons (for 
example, because of credit for previous purchases, shipping costs and so 
forth). This is problematic, as money launderers often make multiple, 
obfuscatory changes to documentation.98
A particular difficulty of bilateral analysis is attempting to exclude legitimate 
explanations for valuation discrepancies. Between two countries, there might 
be a valuation bias (either generally or with respect to the trade relationship) 
or currency fluctuations.
 
99 Major differences exist in customs import 
valuation methodologies100 and customs administrative fees (which are often 
built into the import price).101 For example, in a bilateral transaction, imports 
are valued on a c.i.f. basis,102 whereas exports are valued on an f.o.b. basis.103 
The difference is the freight and insurance cost; however, these costs are 
heterogeneous and therefore difficult to account for systematically. 
Nevertheless, they must be accounted for, as indeed must the possibility that 
the valuation has changed while goods are in transit,104
                                                 
92 Ibid.  
 or the trading parties 
have failed to hedge against exchange rate movements. Lastly, accurate 
records actually need to exist in both countries, which is unlikely to be the 
case with shipments originating from or transiting through developing or non-
compliant economies. 
93 Ibid.  
94 Bhagwati, ‘On the Underinvoicing of Imports’, above n 53, 391. 
95 De Wulf, above n 91, 303–4. 
96 Ibid.  
97 Delston and Walls, above n 7, 104–6. 
98 Ibid. 
99 De Wulf, above n 91, 305. 
100 Ibid 304. 
101 Ibid.  
102 Cost, Insurance and Freight. 
103 Free on Board. 
104 Bhagwati, ‘On the Underinvoicing of Imports’, above n 53, 391.  
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While unit price analysis avoids the problems of obtaining comparable trade 
data, it has its own problems. First, it is only effective when goods are 
homogeneously and consistently valued (for example commodities).105 When 
this is not the case, then unit price analysis is ineffective because a robust 
mean for the goods cannot be calculated. Consider for example, the problem 
of shippers labelling goods as ‘textiles’ or ‘gifts’ – categories that are 
obviously far too broad to justify the key assumption that the average price 
approximates the market price. Second, a fundamental weakness is that unit 
price analysis depends on the existence of a benchmark against which 
‘abnormality’ can be assessed. This benchmark is normally set at an outer 
quartile (that is, a substantial deviation from the mean).106 A lower benchmark 
would, in most product categories, produce considerably more false positives. 
While such analysis is effective at catching tax fraud (as tax minimisation 
relies on a large difference between price and value), the inherent flaw from a 
capital transfer perspective is that reducing the price discrepancy while 
increasing volume can circumvent detection techniques but not reduce the 
utility of the transaction to the launderer.107
IV THE THREAT POSED BY TBML/TFT TYPOLOGIES 
 
A comprehensive response to the TBML/TF threat will require expansive 
regulation of the international shipping and transport sector.108
                                                 
105 De Boyrie, Pak and Zdanowicz, Money Laundering and Income Tax Evasion, above n 
 Given the cost 
of such regulation, it is prudent to proportion the remedy relative to the threat 
posed by TBML/TF. However, there is little data available on the significance 
of TBML/TF’s effects and even less on the cost of proposed responses. While 
measures such as TTUs have a certain initial appeal, there is a question about 
whether they are a value for money proposition relative to the threat posed by 
TBML/TF. 
4, 
126–7. 
106 Ibid.  
107 For example, $1 000 000 can be laundered by under-invoicing 125 000 widgets valued at 
$10 for $2 (an $8 discount). Alternatively, the launderer can send 1 000 000 widgets priced at 
$9 (a $1 discount). In the latter example, such a small departure from the mean unit price 
would likely go undetected, whereas the large difference in the former example would be 
detected. Either way, the launderer has transferred the same amount. 
By contrast, if the offender were seeking to minimise their tax, this strategy would be 
ineffective. Assume, for example, that the import duty was five per cent of the value declared 
to customs. In the first case, tax levied would be $12 500, while in the second it would be 
$450 000. In the latter case, tax would be only slightly minimised relative to the actual 
liability ($500 000). 
108 Delston and Walls, above n 7, 106–10; Best Practices Paper on Trade Based Money 
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The cost effectiveness of AML/CTF regulation is an issue of general 
importance, extending well beyond the trade sector. Unfortunately, the 
evidence that is available is neither transparent nor, many claim, particularly 
reliable. Brigitte Unger et al have described the ‘evidence’ on money 
laundering’s effects as being ‘“black box” … estimates [that] arbitrarily 
circulate like magic figures throughout the world’.109 These estimates, which 
‘international organizations refer to … constantly’,110 are rightly and 
appropriately criticised for not being reproducible, transparent or scientific.111 
The global organisations that cite them ‘reveal a disturbing tendency to quote 
each other’s work; since they enjoy substantially the same membership, this 
practice amounts to self-corroboration’.112 Without significant countervailing 
engagement with these organisations,113
Most literature on money laundering effects is pure speculation. … [It uses] 
sentences such as ‘it is clear from available evidence’ that money 
laundering has such and such effects, without ever giving a hint where this 
evidence should be.
 much of the literature is anecdotal in 
nature: 
114
Of course, part of the broader problem is one of data availability. There is 
little reliable data on the volume of capital that is laundered,
 
115
                                                 
109 Brigitte Unger et al, The Amounts and the Effects of Money Laundering (Report for the 
Ministry of Finance (Netherlands), 16 February 2006) 3.  
 which of 
course, makes estimating its effects almost impossible. Within this context, it 
is not possible to convincingly demonstrate the effects of money laundering 
generally, let alone the particular effect of TBML/TF. This, in turn, makes 
responding proportionally to the TBML/TF threat very difficult.  
110 Ibid.  
111 Ibid 38; Donato Masciandaro and Raffaella Barone ‘Worldwide Anti-Money Laundering 
Regulation: Estimating Costs and Benefits’ (2008) 10(3) Global Business and Economics 
Review 243, 253; F Schneider, ‘Money laundering and financial means of organised crime: 
some preliminary empirical findings’ (2008) 10(3) Global Business and Economics Review 
309, 323.  
112 Nigel Morris-Cotterill, ‘Think Again: Money Laundering’ Foreign Policy [2001] 
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2006), 562-3.  
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A Economic Effects and the Capital Flight Context 
That said, TBML/TF is, in some respects, little more than a particular subset 
of a much larger phenomenon: capital flight motivated by rational, wealth-
maximising economic behaviour.116 There is a very large volume of 
international capital that flows out of countries for rational risk aversion 
reasons. Such reasons include the threat of expropriation,117 fiscal deficits,118 
currency devaluation,119 economic uncertainty and political risk and 
insecurity.120 According to Maria de Boyrie, Simon Pak and Peter Zdanowicz 
such flows can ‘erode a country’s tax base, increase public deficit, reduce 
domestic investment and destabilize financial markets’.121 Recognising this, 
countries at risk of capital flight impose tight foreign exchange controls as a 
means of retaining national wealth. These controls are commonly avoided by 
use of the trade system, with the literature documenting trade-based capital 
transfers since at least the post-war years, if not earlier.122
The volume of illegal capital exports in the trade system is significant. Peter 
Zdanowicz, Simon Pak and Michael Sullivan estimate that, in 1995, capital 
flight from Brazil into the United States in the trade system amounted to 
between US$2 and US$4 billion.
  
123 In another study, Simon Pak, Stelios 
Zanakis and Peter Zdanowicz used the same framework to estimate that, in 
1995, trade mispricing exported around US$5.5 billion of capital from Greece 
– or four per cent of gross domestic product.124
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unlawfully exported from Switzerland to the US through the trade system.125 
On a monthly basis, this amounts to between 10 per cent and 50 per cent of 
total trade volume.126 In countries with very high sovereign risk, the estimates 
become astronomical. The Russian government estimates that up to US$400 
billion was exported unlawfully during post-Soviet transition, an estimate 
thought by some academics to be much lower than the true figure.127
Making an empirical distinction between capital flight and TBML/TF is 
difficult, as both are subject to substantial measurement problems, and are not, 
in any case, mutually exclusive. Thus, any economic observations about 
effects must be largely conceptual. A distinction between TBML/TF and 
capital flight is exemplified by the fact that the latter, while a problem for 
many countries, is not itself usually distortionary. It is rational to diversify 
away from areas of abnormally high systemic or sovereign risk. In this sense, 
the capital flows observed from high-risk countries are not themselves 
distortionary but rather symptoms of distortion.
 
128 TBML/TF on the other 
hand, is unambiguously distortionary. In general terms, money laundering 
distorts consumption129 and investment,130 by allocating capital on grounds 
other than wealth-maximisation, that is, on the value derived from obscuring 
the money, rather than economic utility. Further, money laundering redirects 
capital from high-savers to low-savers,131
A particular effect of TBML/TF (and indeed capital flight) is the scope for 
import/export prices to be inefficiently determined. An excess of supply or a 
depressed import price could depress local prices through dumping,
 the capital then being consumed in a 
less than optimal way. Of course, whether or not such an effect is significant 
or merely theoretical is largely unknown. 
132
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whereas a lack of supply or an excessive import price could (in the absence of 
effective competition133) exacerbate supra-competitive pricing. This effect 
might be exacerbated by the fact that money launderers do not seek out a 
competitive price – they both buy and sell goods with an endogenous 
valuation (the ‘value’ of the crime, rather than the product). Further, 
depending on the value of trade flows, TBML/TF could theoretically 
exacerbate a balance of payments problem.134 There is some scope for 
TBML/TF to destabilise global capital because movements would not reflect 
differences in economic fundamentals across countries.135
An additional issue is that TBML/TF will direct capital away from countries 
with rigorous border procedures, and into those jurisdictions with no import 
controls.
 It is worth noting, 
however, that in the countries most at risk of such volatility (for example, 
those with comparatively illiquid currencies), the likelihood of economic and 
political instability may also be distorting currency markets. 
136 While this may mean that trade goods are directed sub-
optimally,137
As noted earlier, whether or not these observations are empirically significant 
is largely unknown. Both Vito Tanzi
 the need for resale markets – together with the fact that trade 
monitoring is almost uniformly inadequate – tempers this effect.  
138 and Peter Quirk139 attempted to use 
cash-in-circulation data to measure foreign exchange instability caused by 
money laundering. Further, Quick has attempted to find a correlation between 
gross domestic product and a growth in the money laundering rate.140 These 
papers are useful, but their high level of macroeconomic abstraction does not 
assist in identifying the specific effects of TBML/TF. Walker has attempted to 
use input/output analysis to show the employment and consumption effect of 
money laundering, though his analysis is of little application in the TBML/TF 
context.141
                                                 
133 Walker, above n 
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129, 33; Douglas I Keh, ‘Economic Reform and Criminal Finance’ (1996) 
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134 Unger et al, above n 109, 86. 
135 Tanzi, above n 130, 8; Unger et al, above n 109, 89.  
136 Trade Based Money Laundering, above n 8, 5. 
137 Tanzi, above n 130, 6. 
138 Vito Tanzi ‘Macroeconomic Implications of Money laundering’ in Ernesto Ugo Savona 
(ed), Responding to Money Laundering, International Perspectives (Harwood Academic 
Publishers, 1997) 91, 91-104, cited in Unger et al, above n 109, 102. 
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Muddying the Macroeconomy’ [1997] (March) Finance & Development, 7, 7–9.  
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of crime domestically generated and laundered,142
Given how little is known about the economic effects of TBML/TF, there are 
good reasons to be prudent in formulating a policy response. It is worth 
bearing in mind ‘Lilley’s Option’, that is, the option to ‘do nothing’. Lilley’s 
Option was named after a former Conservative cabinet minister in the United 
Kingdom, who, as the story goes, insisted that maintaining the status quo be 
inserted into all policy recommendations. The intent was to remind 
policymakers of the need for proportionality in any response. In the present 
circumstances, in the absence of any reliable data on the scale of TBML/TF 
and the extent to which it is distorting otherwise well functioning markets, 
there is scope for the remedy to be worse than the disease. Increased 
TBML/TF regulation would increase the cost of international trade, with an 
obvious effect on prices. Further, it would act as a trade barrier – with 
consequently profound effects on domestic competitiveness and productivity. 
Given this, further research is needed before extensive new regulation is 
adopted. 
 an assumption with obvious 
problems in the TBML/TF context. 
B The Crime Causation Thesis and the Social Effect of 
TBML/TF 
Putting aside these economic issues, it is worth noting that a large proportion 
of the money laundering literature is concerned with ‘crime causation’, that is, 
the idea that ‘money laundering helps make crime worthwhile’.143 ‘Crime’, 
writes Peter Lilley, ‘can only succeed if the funds generated can be utilized 
without their true source being known’.144 If the proceeds of crime are 
confiscated or are otherwise rendered valueless, then the purpose of much 
crime simply evaporates. This assumption underlies both AML/CTF laws and 
proceeds of crime legislation. Indeed, a multiplier allegedly exists whereby 
the proceeds of crime fund future criminal activity – thereby begetting more 
revenue and consequently more crime.145
                                                 
142 Unger et al, above n 
 Donato Masciandaro has 
empirically demonstrated that this multiplier can, theoretically, negate the 
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benefits of enforcement.146
So, simply put, deterring money laundering is equivalent to deterring crime – 
the latter being, of course, undesirable from economic,
 In any case, according to this thesis, if proceeds 
are confiscated and this multiplier reduced, then the future crime rate is 
improved. 
147 social, and ethical 
standpoints. This simple logic obscures the essential empirical question of 
crime deterrence: are the actual or threatened prosecutions of an offence likely 
to deter its commission in the future? There is no clear or empirically sound 
consensus answer to this question.148 There is some research suggesting that 
the money laundering rate is insensitive to changes in the number of money 
laundering prosecutions conducted because the demand for it is linked to the 
predicate crime, and thus, as long as there is crime-for-profit, there will 
always be money laundering.149 Whether or not this is correct, it nevertheless 
invites a second, more difficult, question on whether the prosecution of 
money laundering offences can be empirically shown to deter the commission 
of predicate offences.150
It is well beyond the scope of this paper to attempt to answer this question. 
One expects that the answer must be no, as law enforcement cannot ever hope 
to prosecute enough AML/CTF offences to render crime unprofitable at 
anything other than the margins. Indeed, it is worth noting the improbability 
of increased TBML/TF prosecutions alone having a measurable effect on the 
entrenched international crime syndicates and terrorist networks that profit 
from it. As put by Előd Takáts, ‘it is hard to imagine drug dealers stopping 
their illicit trade in response to money laundering prosecution alone’.
  
151
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V CONCLUDING REMARKS 
According to the FATF, ‘[i]nherent vulnerabilities in the international trade 
system … provide abundant opportunity for criminal organisations and 
terrorist groups to transfer value across borders’.152 In many respects, this is 
all that is known about the TBML/TF problem — there is a ‘chink in the 
armour’ but we do not know how much it is utilised or even how to close it. 
There is an ‘opportunity’ to abuse the trade system but how much it is being 
exploited and how much it will cost to remove it are unknown factors. ‘The 
bad guys know how open the system is’ says Stephen Flynn. ‘The good guys 
do not have a real command on it … because we have not paid as much 
attention to this problem as we need to’.153
The absence of data on TBML/TF is particularly concerning in light of the 
fact that TBML/TF is a credible substitute for traditional, financial system 
money laundering typologies. If offenders are able to avoid the ambit of 
AML/CTF legislation by switching to the trade system in substantial numbers, 
then costly regulation of the financial sector loses much of its lustre. The fact 
that those most able to take advantage of TBML/TF are likely to be the larger, 
organised crime syndicates that the AML/CTF legislation sets out to detect 
makes this even more concerning.  
  
Be that as it may, preventing TBML/TF will take more than importing 
AML/CTF strategies from the financial sector, which can be of questionable 
effectiveness even in their own context. Instead, a robust new approach to 
AML/CTF in the trade sector will be required. It is clear ‘[that] to be 
effective, it should encompass [traders]’.154
 
 Traders though, are not banks. By 
and large, they lack the sophisticated and entrenched institutional mechanisms 
for compliance that exist in financial institutions. They lack customer 
relationship management platforms; indeed, they often have little direct 
contact with customers at all. They are lightly regulated in many respects and 
are directed at a diverse range of industry sectors – from consumer 
transactions to bulk-material shipping. Given this, how authorities will 
regulate traders in order to monitor billions of transactions, encompassing 
millions of containers, in a cost-effective and efficient way is the great, 
uncontemplated challenge of TBML/TF enforcement. 
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